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ABSTRACT 
We study the implication of credit constraints for the sustainability of product market 
collusion in a bank financed Cournot duopoly when firms face an imperfect credit 
market. We consider two situations without or with credit rationing. When there is no 
credit rationing moderately higher cost of external finance may affect the degree of 
collusion, but a substantial increase keeps it unaffected. Permanent adverse demand 
shock in this set up does not affect the possibility of collusion, but may aggravate the 
finance constraint and eventually lead to collusion. We also discuss the case with 
credit rationing.  
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Section: 1 - Introduction 
Financial crises in recent times have renewed interest in research on the causes and 
consequences of such crises. The Asian crisis of 1990s and the most recent one 
originating in the United Sates have affected large number of business houses across 
the globe. Line of credit is an essential input in business processes world-wide, large 
or small. If you do not have access to credit, you cannot run a business. Thus working 
capital and day to day availability of credit is of utmost importance to any firm. The 
choice of the capital structure of a firm in an oligopoly was discussed way back in the 
80s by Brander and Lewis in their famous paper [Brander and Lewis (1986)]. The 
nature of competitive strategies in the product market could determine firm choice 
between debt and equity capital. In this paper we consider the case where firms have 
to depend on bank finance for production and their internal capital or finance is 
inadequate for their desirable levels of production. Thus the firms do not have any 
choice in terms of the capital structure once they decide the level of production. This 
characterization of the financing process echoes the concern that credit market is 
essentially imperfect and internal cash flow of a firm is very important since 
borrowing is costly relative to the opportunity cost of self owned capital or credit, 
terms which we use interchangeably throughout the paper. In a way we draw from the 
well known work of Glenn Hubbard (1990) and others. That credit is a critical 
element in explaining macroeconomic implications of business cycles was also 
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demonstrated in Bernanke and Gertler( 1989 ).  
In this paper we are interested in the relationship between sustainability of collusion 
and the level of credit in a Cournot oligopoly. First, we focus on a case where firms 
are not credit rationed, but have to pay a higher borrowing rate than the lending rate. 
This is the simplest way of characterizing imperfect credit market and has been used 
extensively in macro and development economics such as in Gal-Or and Zeira (1993), 
Banerjee and Newman (1993), Basu (2003) etc. It is quite natural that to understand 
the consequence of credit constraints on the strategic decisions of firms, one needs to 
use an oligopolistic structure. Unfortunately models that discuss strategic decisions of 
firms under credit constraints are rare. To the best of our knowledge non-cooperative 
and collusive strategies of firms under credit constraints has been discussed by 
Bagliano and Dalmazzo (1999) and Bevia, Corchon and Yasuda (2014) and in the 
context of bankruptcies of firms. Their papers are different from ours as we focus on 
the collusive strategies of firms when they face credit constraint without uncertainty. 
We do not consider possibilities of bankruptcies but point towards a rather interesting 
result that severe constraints may not impact the degree of collusion, but moderate 
ones do. We also suggest that if we follow Cournot or Bertrand models, then 
permanent adverse demand shocks will not affect collusion until and unless we bring 
in explicitly the role of internal finance. Therefore, the case for product market shocks 
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as standalone reasons for collusion as in Rothemberg and Saloner (1986) gets weaker. 
Fixed and working capital related issues in imperfect product market and their 
implications for macroeconomic outcomes have been studied by Das (2004). More 
recently Dellas and Fernandes (2014) discuss financial structure and imperfect 
markets within a macro framework deriving many interesting implications. But their 
model does not look at the possibility of collusion in a repeated game as we do in this 
paper. In a different context the credit market and  trade  policy reforms were 
analyzed in a set up when firms choose to outsource their production to unorganized 
extra legal entities by Marjit, Ghosh and Biswas (2007) and in the context of 
outsourcing under financial crisis by Bandopadhyay, Marjit and Yang (2014). The 
way they model the use of working capital is related to this paper, but both deal with a 
competitive structure and the focus is entirely different from this paper. Credit 
constraints may affect the pattern of joint ventures and can lead to a buy-out. Marjit 
and RayChaudhuri (2004) discusses such an issue without explicitly modeling the 
credit market aspect of the problem. 
A related paper to ours is the well cited work of Rothemberg and Saloner (1986) who 
explained the existence of the counter cyclical mark up in a dynamic model of 
oligopoly. They explain why during a boom it is hard to sustain collusion and hence 
mark ups falter because of the increasing possibility of deviations from tacit collusive 
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agreement. In our paper we try to argue that if firms are hit very hard by financial 
constraints and they think that the shock is permanent, it may not impact the degree of 
collusion. In fact the linear Cournot example and the general Bertrand case, the 
degree of collusion is exactly the same when there was no such constraint. While their 
concern is with the size of the market, ours is with the availability of finance. We 
return to this comparison later in the paper. Our case also captures situations where 
firms may have very little of their own capital or they may be extremely well 
endowed. But as long as credit is available at a price, such extreme situations may 
imply similar possibility of collusion. In brief we bring in the credit side of product 
market collusion, as a complementary element to Rothemberg and Saloner (1986). 
In the next section we develop the basic model and results. Section 3 discusses the 
credit rationing problem and its impact on collusion and in the last we conclude the 
paper. 
Section: 2 - Cournot Model and Results 
Consider a market with two firms producing a homogeneous product X competing in 
Cournot fashion. If a represents the market size of the world, the inverse-demand 
function for our product is given by qaP −= , where P is the price of the product and 
q the quantity produced. We stick to the linearity assumption for closed from solution 
and as a follow up of Rothemberg and Saloner (1985) who also uses the linear 
structure. For simplicity, we assume the production of good X to require labor alone. 
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Let α  denote the labor requirement to produce one unit of output X. To simplify the 
analysis, we assume that the wage rate is equal to one; hence, the unit production cost 
for X isα . Each firm is endowed with k amount of own capital. We also assume that 
the labor cost has to be paid before production, which implies that firms require credit 
to pay wages if they do not have sufficient capital stock.  
There are two features of the imperfect credit market. First, borrowing rate R is 
greater than the lending rate r because banks have cost of intermediation. This implies 
that firms lend out their capital at interest rate r , but have to pay interest rate R  to 
the bank ( R r> ) if they face credit constraints. Second, the credit amount could be 
restricted, which implies firms cannot borrow enough money even if firms pay 
lending rate R and the amount of loan they get will be related to their own wealth. 
We initially analyze the scenario without credit amount restriction. In this case firms 
can get any amount of loan if they pay lending rate R . In next section we will relax 
this assumption and analyze the changes in equilibrium results.  
2.1 Under No Credit Constraints 
We began by analyzing the scenario where firms do not have credit constraints. Let 
1q and 2q represent the output of firm 1 and firm 2 respectively. As net lenders can 
lend out their surplus wealth at interest rate r , they can obtain a return of  −   
where  to be read as 1 + .  
Therefore firm 1’s profit under production is  
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 =  −  −  +  −   
If firm 1 does not engage in production, he can lend out all of its wealth, and earn . 
Therefore, firm 1’s net profit from production is  
 =  −  −  −                                         … (1) 
In the Oligopoly market, each firm earns Cournot profit if they do not collude with 
each other. Each of them will earn half of the Monopoly profit if they collude with 
each other. However, they can earn more profit by deviating even though they have 
agreed to collude with each other. Let Cournotq , Mq and Cheatingq denote the output level 
under Cournot, Monopoly and the deviating from collusion respectively. Accordingly
Cournotpi , Mpi and Cheatingpi  represent the profit level under Cournot competition, the 
Monopoly profit and the profit of deviating from collusion respectively. 
From standard solution in Cournot model, we find that  
 =                                                …. (2) 
If two firms collude with each other, each will earn half of the Monopoly profit, 
Hence we have  

  =

                                                      … (3) 
If firm 1 deviates from collusion, his profit becomes 
 !" = # −  − $ %  −        
From the first order condition, we have  
 !" = &$                                                 … (4) 
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We follow the simplest procedure for modeling collusion as the trigger strategy 
equilibrium in infinitely repeated games a la Friedman (1971) and as exposited in 
Gibbons (1992). We abstract from more finer refinements as in Abreau (1988), since 
our purpose is to focus on the impact of credit availability on collusion rather than 
collusion per se. 
   Let 1δ denote the critical value for the trigger strategy equilibrium under no credit 
constraints. We have 
1
1
92
17
Cheating M
Cheating Cournot
pi pi
δ
pi pi
−
= =
−
.                                          … (5) 
2.2 Under Full Credit Constraints 
Consider now when credit constraints binds, i.e. 1
2 M
q kα > . This implies that  
Cournotq kα > and Cheatingq kα >  because as 
1
2 M Cournot Cheating
q q q< < .  
Severity of the constraint is characterized by the fact that the firms cannot produce the 
optimum amount in any regime. If they cannot produce the monopoly output , they 
surely cannot produce Cournot or the deviation output. 
In this case the net profit of firm 1 is  
 =  −  −  −  − ' −  where ' to be read as 1 + ' 
=  −  −  + ' + ' −                                 … (6) 
Similar to the analysis in the previous section, we have  
 = ( + ' −                                        … (7) 

  =
(
 + ' −                                           … (8) 
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 !" = (&$ + ' −                                    … (9) 
Let 2δ denote the critical value for the trigger strategy equilibrium under full credit 
constraints. We have 
2 1
1
92
17
Cheating M
Cheating Cournot
pi pi
δ δ
pi pi
−
= = =
−
.                                     … (10) 
This leads to the following Proposition. 
Proposition - 1 
Collusion is equally sustainable under no constraints and full constraints.  
The intuition is clear. The degree of collusion depends on relative pay offs or the 
differences in them. Since firms having  amount of internal finance will always 
earn k(R-r) as the premium no matter whatever their strategy, that does not feature 
anywhere in the determination of delta. In the linear example the ratios between 
various pay offs are constant independent of marginal cost i.e. r or R, hence the result.  
 
One can interpret the story we have been telling so far in terms of firms which have 
fairly low or fairly high capital endowment. It is a story that befits the case of large 
number of potential entrepreneurs of developing countries with very little endowment 
of capital as well as richer sections of firms in the developed as well as in the 
developing countries. In the simple structure developed above, degree of collusion 
among firms in those separate groups, very poor and very rich, should be the same. Of 
course there will be factors such as number of firms in each group, possibility of 
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monitoring etc. But the intuition that in both of these rather extreme cases all relevant 
pay offs are symmetrically affected essentially does the trick. In the linear example 
the result becomes exactly symmetric. 
2.3 Under Partial Credit Constraints 
We consider two possible situations to focus on partial credit constraints. In the first, 
we analyze the consequence of a slight relaxation of the constraint starting with the 
fully constrained case. In the second we discuss the case when starting from the 
unconstrained case we enter the zone with constraints. 
In the first case the credit constraint does not bind under collusion, but bind under 
Counot competition and cheating. This implies that   Cheating Cournotq q kα α> >  while
1
2 M
q kα < . Hence firms do not need to borrow from the bank if they share the 
monopoly output. 
In this case we have 
 = ( + ' −                                … (11) 

  =

                                                     … (12) 
 !" = (&$ + ' −                                      … (13) 
Let 3δ denote the critical value for the trigger strategy equilibrium under partial credit 
constraints. 
)* = +,-./0123
4
+5
+,-./0123+,678260  
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=
9/:;<
=> ?@(
/:;8
A
9/:;<
=> 
/:;<
9
                                  … (14) 
To compare the Monopoly profit under credit constraints and that under no credit 
constraints, we take derivatives of Mpi  with respect to R . We have 
2M Mq kR
pi
α
∂
= − +
∂
.  
If the monopolist needs to borrow then we have 1
2 m
k qα< . Hence we have
0M
R
pi∂
<
∂
. This implies that the monopoly profit decreases when R increases. We also 
have 
1
2 ' =  =  
 − 
8  
1
2
 − '
4 + ' −  <
1
2
 − 
4  
Hence we have 
(
$ + ' −  < 

$  when R r> . This implies that the 
Monopoly profit under credit constraints is less than that under no credit constraints 
even if there is a premium for having greater internal finance ( ( )k R r− ).Thus we can 
show 3 1 2δ δ δ< = , hence collusion is more sustainable under partial credit constraints.  
It is interesting to recast the problem in a different way by suggesting that we study 
the impact on delta as we move from an unconstrained to a constrained situation. This 
is the second case. It is possible that for some reason the level of internal equity falls 
and the constraint becomes binding. 
It is obvious that the cheating output should be the first to be affected since it requires 
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highest credit, other two pay offs are not affected. Cheating output will fall. 
Consider the case where F is such that 3/8 − ' ≤ F i.e. the deviation output is 
less than or equal to F. We consider reducing  a little bit from 3/8 − '. We 
can show that the gross profit Ω denoted as  
Ω = &$  − ' + ' −  < &$  −                           … (15) 
As  drops further Duopoly profit is affected but K + ' −  can increase with 
R iff 2 9M  − ' <  < N  − '                               …. (16) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-1 describes the movement of ) with respect . As  drops from , cheating 
profit goes down, ) falls, but cournot output is constraint free. Once  drops further 
and Cournot output is constrained, (16) shows for a range Cournot profit may go up, 
raising ) because of “rising rival’s cost” effect. Finally in the neighbourhood of , 
) must be lower than )O as the monopoly output is free of constraint.  
Proposition 2 - Response of P to the level of equity capital is non monotonic. 
However, for low enough initial k collusion possibility will increase with a rise in 
k. Similarly for a high enough k collusion possibility will increase with a drop in 
k. In the middle range the collusion possibility will go down when the non 
 
) ) 
F 
9 17M  9 17M  
Figure – 1 
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cooperative pay off is favorably affected by a rise in the interest.  
Proof: See the discussion above and Figure-1. QED 
Section: 3 – Credit Rationing 
We follow the simple framework developed in Aghion and Banerjee (2005). If L is the 
loan given by the bank, q represents the probability of default and R is the penalty 
that can be imposed by the bank, then bank will choose maximum 
S = SF s.t. S + T − T ≤ πL + K − LR − kr − qβk 
or S ≤ ]^@@  or SF = ]^( .                                           …. (18) 
Let us define SF = `and SF +  = `, bc > 0                       … (19) 
Earlier for the case with no credit rationing we have defined )O such that 
1 2M  + ' −  = f1 − )Og + )OK + f1 − )Og' −  + )O' −  
1 2M  = f1 − )Og + )OK                                         … (20) 
As soon as b binds, h drops making collusion more likely, though i and 
K and free of rationing.  
As long as K is unconstrained, h keeps falling with  increasing the possibility of 
collusion. But as soon as K  is constrained K  starts rising due to capacity 
commitment effect. Hence RHS in (20) rises due to that effect. But h keeps falling 
and when h = K, 1 2M i > K . Hence ∀ ) collusion is the outcome.  
Section 4: Concluding Remarks 
What we have shown in this paper is that the sustainable degree of collusion is 
non-monotonic with respect to the debt-equity ratio. But a drastic fall in own equity 
will increase the possibility of collusion. Larger debt/equity ratio has a greater chance 
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of sustaining collusion provided the non cooperative pay off is not favorably affected. 
Adverse demand shock by itself may not affect collusion, but will affect  and hence 
will lead to collusion. Similarly positive demand shock will relax constraints and 
reduce the mark up. Thus financial factors determine the counter cyclical behavior of 
mark up.  
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